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I Introduction
In the 1970s, the World Bank and development
NGOs inhabited largely separate universes. During
the 1980s, several factors converged to bring these
highly divergent development actors into more
intimate contact. Disappointed with the poor
results of traditional, state-centred, 'hardware'-
dominated development approaches, and in line
with the 'New Policy Agenda", the World Bank
(along with other official donors) 'discovered'
NGOs.2 The attraction of NGOs lay in their dual
role as supposedly more effective and efficient
(than state) deliverers of development services and,
as members of civil society, vehicles of democrati-
sation and good governance. Simultaneous to these
developments (and at least in part due to the new-
found attention and available resources) the num-
bers and size of development NGOs (both in the
North and South) began to explode.3 With donors
putting their hopes in NGOs as the new 'magic bul-
let' and many (though not all) NGOs anxious to
take advantage of the influx of funds and recogni-
tion, operational relations between NGOs and the
Bank (and official donors more generally) began to
be more systematically developed.
During the same period, many NGOs became more
advocacy-oriented and began to turn their atten-
tion towards the World Bank. They decried the
devastating environmental and social impact of cer-
tain Bank-financed projects, criticised the negative
consequences of structural adjustment pro-
grammes and called for major reforms (or, in some
cases, abolition) of the institution. Throughout the
1980s and 1990s, NGO advocacy campaigns
against the Bank continued to grow, both in num-
ber and impact. At the same time NGO 'collabora-
tion' in the field expandedrapidly
Over the past twenty years, and particularly in the
1990s, issues related to BankNGO interactions
have been monitored and analysed by observers
both within and outside the Bank. On the whole,
however, NGO advocacy activities have tended to
attract more attention than NGO involvement at
the operational level. Of the two, the former seems
to be the sexier, more exciting and morally
satisfying story - with NGOs acting on the side of
'good', defending poor people and protecting the
environment against the capital-driven, market-ori-
ented agendas of the World Bank.
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When it comes to 'operational collaboration'
between the Bank and NGOs the situation is more
ambiguous. What is the real extent of this collabo-
ration? Which NGOs are working with the Bank
and why? Are they contributing to or undermining
the efforts of NGOs involved in advocacy work?
What do these relationships look like on the
ground? What has been their experience and
impact?
Part 1 of the article reviews the theoretical benefits
and risks of NGO involvement in Bank-financed
projects. Part 2 reviews what we know (and don't
know) about BankNGO cooperation in practice on
the basis of current information and analysis. Part 3
proposes an analytical framework for distinguishing
between different forms of BankNGO operational
collaboration based on the purpose of that collabo-
ration. Finally, part 4 concludes with recommenda-
tions for both the Bank and NGOs.
2 Theoretical Benefits and Risks
of BankNGO Cooperation
According to the World Bank's Operational Manual
('Good Practice' 14.70), the primary purpose for
seeking collaboration with NGOs is to enhance the
effectiveness of the operations it supports. NGOs
are attributed with social proximity, field-based
development expertise, ability to innovate and
adapt, participatory methodologies and tools and
emphasis on sustainability and cost-effectiveness.
Correspondingly, they are expected to: make pro-
jects more responsive to beneficiary needs; enhance
beneficiary participation throughout the life of the
project; extend project reach; and improve sustain-
ability Other Bank documents also link cooperation
with NGOs to loftier goals such as improvements in
governance and the strengthening of civil society
(Clark 1993). For NGOs, potential benefits in
working with the Bank are identified as the oppor-
tunity to access funds, scale-up their operations,
obtain enhanced recognition, and influence the
decisions and actions of the Bank and governments.
On the other hand, the literature on development
NGOs has identified important potential risks
related to direct funding of NGOs by official (mul-
tilateral and bilateral) donors. These include:
the risk of NGOs being diverted from their
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mission (as they focus on implementing the fun-
der's mission)
weakening downwards accountability (as
upwards accountability to donors takes prece-
dence)
the depoliticisation of NGOs (as development
agendas focus more on service delivery and less
on social transformation)
over-extension of organisational capacities due
to excessive scaling up (leading to breakdowns
in management and operating systems)
loss of flexibility and innovation (due to prede-
fined development agendas and rigid project
plans and procedures)
undermining participatory approaches and
eroded relationships at the community level
(leading to loss of development effectiveness
and, eventually, loss of credibility with both
clients and donors).
Due to its unique nature (as the only global multi-
lateral development bank (MDB)) the World Bank
differs from other donors in a number of important
ways. These particularities, of which NGOs are not
always well aware, present unique opportunities,
but may well also exacerbate risks.
First, as NGO advocacy campaigns against the Bank
vibrantly attest, the development practices of the
Bank and the development paradigm and values on
which they are based are frequently perceived as
being at odds with those of the NGO community at
large. Neither NGOs nor the World Bank are homo-
geneous in their ideological beliefs and Bank
rhetoric has changed significantly in recent years.
Nevertheless, the Bank remains a financial institu-
tion with an economistic, capital-driven vision of
development. Relatively few Bank staff members
have experience in working with NGOs or have
expertise in socially-oriented, community-led
development. If shared vision and a common
understanding of development issues are consid-
ered important factors in promoting successful
working relations, then the World Bank and NGOs
are, in most cases, far from being natural partners.
Second, unlike most donors, the World Bank does
not directly fund NGOs. The Bank's clients are
developing country governments and (with the
exception of some small grants) all resources are
channelled through them. Governments 'own' and
are responsible for projects financed by the Bank.
While loan and project design may permit varying
levels of autonomy and flexibility for participating
NGOs, the overall framework in which their activi-
ties take place is defined and managed by govern-
ment. For NGOs, 'working with the Bank' usually
means 'working with government'. Depending on
the nature of NGOstate relations (that vary enor-
mously from country to country, regime to regime
and NGO to NGO) such interaction may be nei-
ther feasible nor desirable. NGOs must be aware
that World Bank funds are given as loans (not
grants) and, as such, may be subject to stringent
monitoring and relatively complex disbursement
procedures.
A third characteristic of the World Bank, compared
with other donors, is the extremely large scale of its
development interventions. In 1999, for example,
the average size of an international development
assistance (IDA) loan was approximately US$47
million, while the average size of a loan from the
International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD) over three times that (World
Bank 1999: Appendix 14). The potential problems
associated with rapid or excessive scaling-up of
NGO activities are well described in the develop-
ment literature.4 When NGOs become involved in a
World Bank project, targeting tens or even hun-
dreds of thousands of beneficiaries, the chances of
an NGO over-stretching its management capacities,
being tempted to 'bite off more than it can chew', or
being forced to compromise quality for quantity, are
that much higher.
A fourth important difference between the World
Bank and other donors is its operating procedures.
World Bank procedures regardïng, for example, the
procurement of goods and services and accounting
and reporting requirements are geared towards
large-scale interventions and private sector firms.
Most NGOs are largely unaccustomed to such pro-
cedures that, especially when combined with the
bureaucracy of government procedures, can prove
excessively rigid, cumbersome and slow.
A final distinctive feature of the World Bank is its
status as a high-powered and 'high rolling' interna-
tional player. The World Bank carries a lot of influ-
ence. It tends to be arrogant about its own
knowledge. It is better at talking (or dictating) than
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listening and is used to getting its own way Such a
stance can be extremely intimidating to NGOs and
does not facilitate the establishment of trusting,
egalitarian, mutually respectful partnerships. The
imbalance in power, influence and resources that
characterises most donorNGO relations is thus
extreme in the case of NGOBank interactions.
3 BankNGO 'Operational
Collaboration' in Practice
Despite annual reporting by the Bank on its coop-
eration with NGOs, and the publication in recent
years of numerous (Bank and non-Bank) docu-
ments and case studies on the subject, a review of
the literature reveals important gaps in our knowl-
edge and understanding. It is still difficult to deter-
mine the real extent and nature of NGO
involvement in Bank-financed projects and the pur-
pose and impact of that involvement. This is due,
on the one hand, to a lack of reliable empirical
information. While, on the other, there is a ten-
dency to treat 'NGO involvement in Bank projects'
as a monolithic phenomenon, failing to adequately
distinguish between different forms of BankNGO
interaction.
3.1 Extent and nature of NGO involvement
The Bank has monitored 'operational collaboration'
with NGOs since 1973 and has published annual
progress reports on its work with NGOs since 1989.
On the basis of these reports, the Bank claims 'a
remarkable increase in interaction and collabora-
tion between the Bank and the NGO community
world-wide'. Progress reports show a steady
increase in BankNGO cooperation over the past
25 years - with only 6 per cent of Bank projects
having NGO involvement in 1973, compared to 20
per cent in 1989, 30 per cent in 1993 and 50 per
cent in 1998.
Unfortunately the information contained in the
Bank's annual progress reports is subject to two seri-
ous shortcomings. First, information on which
numbers are based derive from project appraisal
reports that are prepared before project activities
even begin. The figures reported, therefore, repre-
sent intended rather than actual NGO involvement.
As a result, they are very unreliable. A recent study
by the Banks Evaluation Department concludes
that, 'by reporting planned involvement rather
than actual results, claims regarding NGO involve-
ment in Bank operations are inflated' (Gibbs et al.
1998: xi).
Second, while the progress reports provide infor-
mation (albeit unreliable) on the quantity of
Bank-NGO cooperation, they tell us nothing about
the quality of that cooperation. As currently
recorded, 'NGO involvement in a Bank project'
could indicate anything from the genuine and sus-
tained participation of a large number of NGOs
through all stages of the project cycle, to the con-
tracting of an NGO for purposes of service delivery,
to an informal lunch meeting with the local Oxfam
representative.
The progress reports do provide information
regarding the stage of the project cycle (identifica-
tion, design, implementation, etc.) at which
involvement occurs. They report that, while most
NGOs are involved in project implementation,
NGO engagement during project design stages has
increased significantly in recent years. This data
gives some hint as to the different roles that NGOs
are playing but still tells us nothing about the pur-
pose, intensity or results of their involvement. Bank
staff in the NGO Unit who prepare the annual
reports are well aware of these weaknesses and
openly acknowledge the limited reliability and use-
fulness of the information they contain. However,
the Bank has as yet to adopt a more meaningful
form of monitoring.
Aggregate-level information regarding the quality
and intensity of NGO involvement in Bank pro-
jects is extremely sketchy One independent
review by Nelson (1995) of 304 Bank projects
with 'NGO involvement' estimates that NGOs
played a 'major role' in only one quarter of these
projects. In three times out of four, NGOs were
involved solely as project implementers.5
Similarly, among the 37 projects assessed in the
field by Gibbs et al. (1998:Annex C), only six (16
per cent) are reported to involve 'substantial'
NGO/CBO (community based organisation) con-
tributions. ln all other cases, NGO contributions
are described as 'small', 'limited', 'modest', 'mini-
mal' or 'negligible'.6
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3.2 Types of NGOs involved in Bank
projects
In monitoring its 'operational collaboration' with
NGOs, the Bank distinguishes between commu-
nity-based organisations, national NGOs and inter-
national NGOs. Since the mid-80s, it reports a
steady increase in the involvement of CBOs and
national NGOs and a decline in the proportion of
projects involving international NGOs.
Apart from this basic 'geographical' breakdown, the
literature on development NGOs proposes numer-
ous more 'qualitative' systems for distinguishing
among NGOs, for example on the basis of their pur-
pose, function, development ideology scale of oper-
ations or proximity to or independence from
government (Korten 1987; Clark 1991; Gow 1979).
Some writers have distinguished between market-
driven and society-based NGOs or have placed
NGOs on a publicprivate continuum (Salmen and
Eaves 1989). Unfortunately at the present time, no
information-gathering or analysis has been under-
taken at the aggregate level to determine what types
of NGOs (in qualitative terms) involve themselves
in Bank projects. Despite a lack of empirical
evidence, it has been hypothesised that larger-scale,
service-oriented NGOs, and those that enjoy col-
laborative relations with governments, are probably
more likely to become involved in Bank-financed
projects than smaller-scale empowerment-oriented
NGOs that see development as a process of social
transformation, or openly oppose mainstream poli-
cies or actions.
3.3 Purpose of NGO involvement
The Bank has multiple purposes for seeking coop-
eration with NGOs, just as NGOs have a variety of
possible motivations for working with the Bank.
Some NGOs, for example, may simply seek to win
contracts as service deliverers while others may
have a more strategic interest in influencing Bank
projects. Bank staff may seek NGO involvement
because they want to better understand 'grassroots
needs', or because they need a low-cost service
provider or because they simply want to cover their
bases and be able to put a tick in the 'NGO involve-
ment' box of their project brief.
Unfortunately, few serious efforts have been made
to assess and analyse the diverse set of purposes for
which NGO involvement in Bank projects is pur-
sued. As mentioned above, the Banks annual
progress reports tell us nothing about the purpose
of NGO involvement in Bank projects. Based on
information from the Bank NGO project database,
Gibbs et al. (1998:8) report that the reasons most
commonly cited by Bank staff for involving
NGOs/CBOs are 'to enhance beneficiary participa-
tion' (72 per cent) and to 'capture expertise7 (64 per
cent). 'Surprisingly', according to the authors,
'innovation and flexibility - commonly cited as
NGO strengths - are not commonly cited as reasons
for involving NGOs/CBOs (9 per cent)'. Virtually no
aggregate information is available concerning NGO
motivations for becoming involved in Bank pro-
jects. Anecdotal evidence indicates that NGOs fre-
quently enter into such arrangements without
thinking through, in a serious way, their own pur-
pose and goals.
3.4 Experience and impact of NGO
involvement
Operational experiences of NGOs working with the
Bank have been described in a number of project-
level case studies (or, in some cases, sectoral or
regional-level reviews) undertaken by the Bank and
NGOs since the mid-80s.8 While confirming the
significant potential benefits of NGO involvement,
these studies have tended to emphasise the numer-
ous institutional and administrative constraints that
impede successful BankNGO collaboration.
Problems that appear repeatedly in the literature
include: poor communication and information-
sharing, lack of mutual understanding between
'partners', lack of clarity regarding NGO roles and
responsibilities, lack of participation, complex and
rigid procedures and delays (in particular in rela-
tion to procurement and disbursement activities).
These studies, while providing valuable information
regarding the operational experiences of NGOs
working with the Bank and the level of success or
failure of individual projects, tell us little about the
overall impact of this collaboration.
The study by Gibbs et al. is the Bank's first serious
attempt to evaluate the operational impact of NGO
involvement at the aggregate level. This study,
which 'sets out to determine if NGO involvement
increased the effectiveness of Bank-supported pro-
jects', is an important and timely piece of work. lt
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involved a desk review of 107 projects with NGO
involvement and a more detailed field review of 37
projects in five countries. While concluding that the
Bank guidelines on promoting collaboration with
NGOs are sound, the study reports many serious
shortcomings in current practice, identifies key
determinants of successful outcomes and makes
valuable recommendations for improved
BankNGO collaboration in future.9
A limitation of the study, however, is that (like the
Bank progress reports) it does not distinguish
between different forms of NGO involvement in
Bank projects at the aggregate level. Since 'NGO
involvement' can vary so enormously, take on so
many distinct forms, with such a wide range of
diverse organisations and for so many different
reasons, seeking to measure impact at this level
becomes an extremely difficult and, arguably,
potentially not very meaningful exercise. Among
the different projects assessed by the study, for
example, we do not know what kind of NGOs were
involved, what their purpose was for becoming
involved, and what the Banks purpose was in
involving them. No distinction is made between
those projects where NGOs were explicitly invited
to contribute to project design as opposed to those
where NGOs were attributed a simple implementa-
tion role. The body of projects evaluated (through
desk review and field study) includes such a wide
range of different experiences that it is not surpris-
ing that '... at the aggregate level, OhO was unable
to link provision for NGO/CBO involvement to
overall outcomes, institutional development or sus-
tainability of projects' and that 'NGOs/CBOs
appears to have no significant effect on meeting
development objectives or making implementation
progress' (Gibbs et al. 1998:xii).
Work undertaken in recent years by practitioners
and scholars (both within and outside the Bank)
has contributed significantly to our knowledge of
NGOBank operational relations. However, our
understanding of the true nature, extent, purpose
and impact of these relationships remains superfi-
cial. On the whole, monitoring continues to
focus on quantity rather than quality and, due to
a failure to distinguish adequately between dif-
ferent forms of NGO involvement, current efforts
to predict and evaluate impacts are of limited
usefulness.
4 'Unpacking' NGO Involvement in
Bank-Financed Projects
NGO involvement in Bank-financed projects can be
categorised in different ways. As mentioned above,
the Bank annual progress report provides a break-
down by type of NGO involved and the stage of the
project cycle at which that involvement occurs.
Nelson (1995) categorises projects according to
'major', 'implementation' or 'minor' roles for NGOs.
This article proposes an alternative system of dis-
tinguishing between different forms of NGO
involvement, differentiated by primary objective or
purpose of the interaction, Instead of focusing on
who is involved, when or how much, its point of
departure is to ask why NGOs are involved in a
given project.
Such a system of categorisatïon is important for
three reasons. First, at an analytical level, it is
important to acknowledge explicitly that NGOs and
the Bank choose to work together for a variety of,
sometimes contradictory reasons. Some forms of
interaction may bring anticipated theoretical bene-
fits while others most certainly will not, and may
result in negative impacts. This acknowledgement, in
itself, is important in order to move away from the
current tendency to treat 'NGO involvement in Bank-
financed projects' as a monolithic phenomenon with
one common set of characteristics and benefits.
In addition, experience shows that, too often, the
Bank and NGOs enter into working relationships
without any prior discussion or agreement concern-
ing the ultimate purpose of their collaboration. For
example, Gibbs et al. (1998:xiv) report that 'in half
the projects assessed, the partners had divergent
objectives, did not understand well how each other
worked, did not match capacities with appointed
roles, and did not adjust their administrative proce-
dures to meet the needs of others'. The system of
classification proposed here emphasises that, in
working together, both the Bank and NGOs are free
to make choices. There is no one predetermined
form of operational cooperation. Each actor must
reflect on its own goals, expectations, capacities and
needs and negotiate its terms of engagement. Being
aware of one's own primary objective and that of
operational counterparts is the first step towards
achieving more honest and productive working
relationships and developing appropriate adminis-
trative arrangements and procedures.
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Third, since judgement of outcomes of BankNGO
collaboration depends upon the purpose for which
that collaboration is undertaken, this system allows
us to predict more accurately the type of benefits
that are likely (or not likely) to result. Particularly,
at this stage in time, with NGO involvement in
Bank-financed projects becoming the norm and the
Bank beginning to assess the operational impact of
this involvement, it is increasingly important to dis-
tinguish more rigorously between different qualities
and purposes of collaboration. This should help to
avoid the creation of unrealistic expectations and
subsequent dismissal of 'collaboration with NGOs'
as an empty promise that failed to deliver hoped-for
results.
On the basis of the primary purpose of BankNGO
cooperation, four distinct forms of NGO involve-
ment are identified. These are NGOs as 'beneficia-
ries', 'mercenaries', 'missionaries' or
'revolutionaries'. As 'beneficiaries', the primary
objective is for NGOs to absorb resources or receive
services. As 'mercenaries', their primary purpose is
to deliver services on behalf of the Bank. As 'mis-
sionaries', NGOs seek to work with the Bank or use
Bank resources to fulfil their own defined develop-
ment mission. In order to do this, they must nor-
mally negotiate or retain some level of operational
independence or influence over project design.
When NGOs intervene or collaborate as 'revolu-
tionaries', their primary purpose is to challenge or
change some aspect of Bank (or government) policy
or action. This might involve, for example, strategic
research, interventions to block or modify a project
or independent monitoring to ensure compliance
with existing policies or agreed safeguards.
As described in Part I, 'NGO involvement in Bank-
financed projects' in reality implies a tripartite rela-
tionship between NGOs, governments and the
Bank. Each of these actors may have their own dis-
tinct purpose in seeking (or accepting) to interact.
Since, to date, most discussions and analyses have
focused on the Bank's motivations for seeking col-
laboration, the system proposed here purposefully
emphasises the various objectives of collaboration
from the point of view of NGOs. In some cases, all
three parties may share the same primary objective
(e.g. improved service delivery). In other cases, the
resulting mode of NGO involvement may be the
product of a process of negotiation between the
parties, e.g. NGOs negotiating influence over pro-
ject design. Most often, however, the objectives of
the various parties are not openly defined and dis-
cussed. As a result, NGOs who consider themselves
'missionaries' may find themselves operating in
'mercenary' role. In order to avoid such misunder-
standings, and the resulting frustrations and fail-
ures, it is essential to acknowledge objectives and
agree to appropriate terms of engagement prior to
establishing working relations.
The four identified categories of NGO involvement
are not necessarily mutually exclusive and the dis-
tinctions between them are not rigid. The same
NGO may intervene as a 'mercenary' in some cases
and a 'missionary' in others, or even intervene
simultaneously as a 'beneficiary/revolutionary' or
'missionary/revolutionary'. A single project may
involve several or all of the identified forms of NGO
interventions. Some of the roles are clearly comple-
mentary (evidence shows that NGO roles as 'bene-
ficiaries' are enhanced when facilitated by
'missionaries') and impacts may be greatest where
several types of NGO interventions are combined.To
The key characteristics of each of these different
forms of involvement are summarised in Table 1.
The theoretical benefits, constraints and likely out-
comes of each are summarised in Table 2.
4.1 NGOs/CBOs as 'beneficiaries'
When NGOs act as 'beneficiaries', the ultimate
objective (for both the Bank and the NGO) is for the
NGO to be the end recipient or user of Bank ser-
vices or resources. The type of NGO involved in
this mode is typically a CBO or other grassroots
membership organisation, sometimes created for
the express purpose of receiving project funds."
Examples of this type of NGO involvement are
numerous and include almost all Bank projects with
activities at the communïty level including, for
example, social funds, rural development projects,
community health education, water and sanitation
projects. Available evidence suggests, in fact, that
this particular form of interaction accounts for a
large percentage of reported NGOWorld Bank col-
laboration. The Bank's most recent annual progress
report states that out of 'NGO-involved projects' 79
per cent involve CBOs - either existing or newly
created. In terms of funding, Gibbs et al. (1998:xi)
report that 'Bank-assisted projects support CBOs far
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more often than NGOs', with over 80 per cent of
funds going to CBOs and only 5 per cent to national
level NGOs. Although CBOs can play other roles,
the primary objective of their involvement is almost
always that of project beneficiary.
As indicated in Table 2, targeting and working
through CBOs can bring important development
benefits - depending on how they are involved in
project activities. If trusting relations are established
with these groups, if participatory methods are used
to understand their true needs, and if they are
encouraged to take the lead in defining their own
development agenda and empowered to do so
(through institutional support, training, coaching,
etc.), then the development results can be impres-
sive. If, on the other hand, they are simply involved
as passive recipients of goods and services, then no
special benefits can be expected to accrue. In this
case, targeting CBOs simply becomes a convenient
way of targeting individuals" - not necessarily
drawing on or investing in the potential of the col-
lectivity
Unfortunately, available evidence indicates that, for
the moment, the Bank participation rhetoric far
surpasses its actions, and that examples of mean-
ingful primary stakeholder participation and
empowerment are rare. Participation of primary
stakeholders is often limited to implementation
stages and aimed at 'mobilising' beneficiaries to ful-
fil predetermined roles rather than 'empowering'
them to influence and share control over develop-
ment activities. Preliminary findings from a current
monitoring exercise by the NGO Working Group
on the Bank, for example, found that only one of
ten 'participatory' projects reviewed involved pri-
mary stakeholders in design stages. (Tandon and
Cordeiro 1998). Nelson (1995) reports that 'partic-
ipation by NGOs and affected people is generally
limited'. I-le observes that, 'what is sought are not
views, priorities or wishes of affected populations
but their 'full commitment to the project' once it
has been sketched out'. Evidence does show that
the chances of achieving meaningful beneficiary
participation are enhanced when this mode of inter-
action is combined with the involvement of 'mis-
sionary' NGOs as project intermediaries/
facilitators.13
Table 1: Classification of different forms of NGO involvement in Bank-financed projects
4.2 NGOs as 'mercenaries'
When NGOs behave as 'mercenaries', their primary
purpose is to sell their services (as project imple-
menters, executing agents or managers) to donors
or governments. Here the World Bank 'uses' NGOs
in an explicitly instrumental way The type of NGO
most frequently involved in this mode of interaction
are what might be called non-profit consulting
firms and what Brown and Korten (1989) refer to as
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market-driven public service contractors (PSCs).
Unlike more value-driven, constituency-based
NGOs, these organisations typically lack a popular
support base. Moreover, although they may adhere
to certain social principles, their primary aim is to
implement the development programme defined by
donors, as opposed to setting their own develop-
ment agendas and goals.
NGO role Primary
purpose of
NGO
involvement
Type of NGO Stakeholder
status
Nature of
involvement
Typical stage
of involve-
ment
How involve.
ment initiated
Financing Frequency
Beneficiary To receive
benefits!
services
Typically a
CBO or GRO
(existing or
created)
Primacy
stakeholder
(target group)
Normally
cooperative
(often passive
recipients vs
active partici-
pants)
Ideally during
design but
most often
limited to
implemeata-
tion
Targeted or
created by
project
BO receives
project
resources
(usually with
cost-sharing
requirement)
Most frequent
Mercenary To deliver
services/imple
ment Banks
mandate
Market-
driven NGOs,
technical
NGOs, public
service
contractors,
non-profit
consulting
finns
Secondary
stakeholder
Conformist!
co-opted
Implement-
anon
Contracted
through
competitive
process
NGO paid for
services from
project
budget
Frequent
Missionary To influence
project
activities!
implement
NGOs own
mandate
Operational
value-driven
or society-
based NGOs,
NGOs with a
defined
development
mission
Secondary
stakeholder
(sometimes
representing
primary
stakeholder
interests)
Reformist
(often critical)
Design and
implement-
ation
Often
selected on
basis of
specific
strengths
NGO paid for
services from
project
budget or
preparation
funds. NGO
may provide
unpaid
advice!
services or
co-financing
less frequent
Revolutionary To challenge
or change
BanWgovern-
ment actions,
decisions and
policies
Advocacy or
research
NGOs, opera-
tional NGOs
with strategic
interests,
oben in
collaboration
with directly
affected
GROs or their
cepresentaives
Often
primary and
secondary
stakeholders
working in
consort
Strategic!
political
(often
conflictual)
Any stage
(pre-
identification
through
M&E)
Normally
initiated by
NGO (often
in objection
to Bank or
government
decisions or
actions)
Coats nor-
mally borne
by NGOs.
Sometimes
NGOs con-
tracted to
conduct
research,
contribute to
design or
oversee pro-
ject imple-
mentation
Least frequent
Table 2: Principal benefits and constraints of different forms of NGO involvement in Bank-financed projects
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NGO role Theoretical benefits Conditions for realising
theoretical benefits
Key constraints Likelihood of realising
theoretical benefits
Beneficiary Enhanced beneficiary
participation
More relevant project
design
Enhanced ownership
and sustainability
Empowerment of
CBOs
Improved develop-
ment impact
s Genuine participation
of primary stakehold-
ers throughout the
project cycle
Effective knowledge
and use of participa-
tory techniques by the
team
s Adequate capacity of
CBOs andlor invest-
ments in CBO
capacity-building
Bank's capacity to
promote meaningful
participation of
primary stakehold
remains limited
Weak capacity of
CBOs
Limited investment in
CBO institutional
assessment and
capacity-building
For the moment, low
Significantly higher
when combined with
the involvement of
missionary NGOs
Mercenary Cost-effective service
delivery
Extended project reach
Adequate NGO capac-
ity (especially techni-
cal and management
skills)
Effective working
relations and appropri-
ate procedures
NGO capacity!
effectiveness as service
deliverers is mixed
Excessive scalïng-up
often problematic
Bank!government
procedures often slow
and cumbersome
s Benefits are limited
but likelihood of
realising them is
relatively high
Missionary Enhanced beneficiary
participation
More responsive,
demand-driven
projects
Better downwards
accountability
Better poverty
targeting
Innovation and
flexibility
Improved
development impact
Adequate NGO capac-
ity (including popular
base, participatory
expertise, technical
and management skills
and ability to
negotiate)
s Sufficient
flexibility!autonomy
for NGOs in project
design
s Effective working
relations and
appropriate
procedures
s Only a subset of
NGOs have requisite
capacities
s NGO influence over
project design remains
limited
s Current procedures
often thwart innova-
ion and flexibility
s For the moment,
medium to low
Still many
institutional, relational
and procedural
obstacles
Revolutionary s Prevents negative
environmentallsocial
impacts
Incorporate alternative
perspectives
Promote downwards
accountability
Ensure compliance
with BanKs environ-
mental and social
policies
s Adequate NGO/CBO
capacity including
relevant expertise,
credibility and (some-
times) networking and
lobbying skills
s Bank/government
willingness to
acknowledge alterna-
tive viewpoints
Only a small number
of NGOs have
adequate skills, time
and resources to
devote to such
activities
Bank/government not
always receptive
s NGO engagement of
this type is relatively
rare, but when it
occurs results are
significant
According to Brown and Korten (1989:62), while 'a
value-driven NGO defines its program based on its
social mission and then seeks the funding required
to implement it, the market-driven PSC starts with
an assessment of prospective funding sources and
defines its program on that basis'. Indeed, many
such NGOs are 'entrepreneurial'. In other words,
they are created in direct response to a demand for
such services and the availability of funds.4 Value-
based NGOs who do have social roots and do have
an independent development mission may also find
themselves working in this mode with the World
Bank. This occurs either due to a conscious deci-
sion to play such a role or due to a poorly under-
stood, poorly negotiated or poorly managed
agreement of collaboration.
Evidence indicates that, after NGO involvement as
'beneficiaries', this is the second most frequent form
of Bank-NGO collaboration. Ne1son review of 304
projects, for example, found that in most projects
(three out of four) NGO roles were limited to pro-
ject implementation. In terms of funding, Gibbs et al.
(1998:xi) report that while almost all projects with
NGO involvement include financial support to
NGOs for implementation purposes, only 17 per
cent include support for project preparation
activities.'5
It is unclear whether the prevalence of NGOs in sim-
ple 'service delivery' roles (as opposed to more influ-
ential roles) is primarily due to Banklgovernment
impositions or due to weak vision and capacity on
the part of NGOs or a willingness on theïr part to be
'used' by the Bank. No doubt, both the instrumental-
ist tendencies of the Bank/governments and NGO
weaknesses play a role. Nelson (1995), for example,
finds clear evidence that Bank staff focus on NGO's
role as service deliverers, with little consideration for
their 'representative' or 'political' roles - as defenders
of the interests of affected groups and communities.
He finds that 'the [Bankl official policy is not col-
laborative but tightly controlled, making room for
NGO involvement on the World Bank's terms'. On
the other hand, Nelson also finds that NGOs in Latin
America tend to play more influential roles, while
African NGOs are twice as likely as those in other
regions to be involved only in 'minor roles' - indicat-
ing that NGOs' relative level of development and
capacity also play a role in determining the nature of
their involvement.
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Governments are also influential in determining the
nature of NGO involvement in Bank projects. While
information is lacking and the situation varies enor-
mously from country to country, governments (like
the Bank) have generally been observed to favour a
limited service delivery-oriented role for NGOs. For
example, in assessing civil society participation in
multilateral lending operations in Latin America,
Tuozzo (1999:12), concludes that, 'governments
tend to embrace forms [of CSO involvementi that
involve distribution of goods and services and
handouts that can bring electoral
benefits'.
While the potential benefits of NGOs acting as
'mercenaries' are somewhat limited, the likelihood
that successful working relations can be established
and the desired outcomes realised are relatively
high. Because the purpose of 'mercenary' NGOs is
not to challenge or change Bank policy and proce-
dures but rather to support them, this type of
BankNGO interaction is most likely to be cooper-
ative. The NGOs in question often resemble the pri-
vate sector firms with whom the Bank is
accustomed to working and are normally familiar
and able to cope with the Bank's private sector-ori-
ented procedures. 'Mercenary' NGOs may be able to
bring specialised skills and cost-effective imple-
menting capacity but, since they do not possess
those characteristics normally associated with the
NGO sector (ties to local communities, commit-
ment to poverty reduction, independent develop-
ment vision), this type of collaboration should not
be expected to bring value-added in terms of inno-
vative/alternative approaches or enhanced commu-
nity participation and ownership.
4.3 NGOs as 'missionaries'
As 'missionaries', NGOs seek to be valued not just
for what they do, but for who they are. In this mode,
the objective of NGOs is not only to deliver services
(though their role may involve that) but also to
influence the objectives, design and operational
procedures of the project and to apply their own
operational methodologies and tools. In addition to
technical skills, NGOs in this case have their own
explicit development mission, goals and values and,
in some cases, a clearly defined constituency base.
Rather than implementing a donor's development
mandate (as NGOs operating as 'mercenaries' set
out to do) here the objective of NGOs is to imple-
ment their own mandate with the use of donor
funds. They may also aim to encourage Bank and
government to adopt approaches they have pio-
neered and to listen to their advice regarding devel-
opment priorities and strategies. In order to do this,
these NGOs must be able to negotiate a certain level
of operational independence and/or influence
throughout the various stages of the project cycle.
Situations where NGOs have the opportunity to
intervene as 'missionaries' include: projects that are
based upon NGOs innovations or where NGOs
have encouraged the Bank to take their tested expe-
riences/approaches to scale;'6 projects where NGOs
participate actively in identification and design;
NGO-managed pilot phases; projects that fund
NGO-designed and managed sub-projects or com-
ponents; and NGO participation in project boards,
steering committees or other management or deci-
sion-making structures.
As discussed above, however, this mode of
involvement occurs much less frequently than
NGO interventions in 'mercenary' mode. This is
due both to 'supply' and 'demand' factors. On the
supply side, only a subset of NGOs has the com-
mitment and capacity required to offer innova-
tions and resist donor domination. In order for
this mode of interaction to be effective, NGOs
must have: a clearly defined mission, relevant
operational skills (including participatory exper-
tise), adequate knowledge about the Bank, and
negotiating prowess (typically underpinned by
private sources of income).
On the demand side, as has been shown, both the
Bank and governments have a tendency to seek to
'use' NGOs for their own purposes (rather than sup-
porting NGOs' own mission and goals). Even when
the Bank and/or government do genuinely seek to
benefit from NGO 'innovation and flexibility', prede-
fined project frameworks and rigid procedures often
hamper NGOs' ability to innovate and, in practice,
reduce their role to that of project implementer.
Evidence regarding NGOs' ability to negotiate con-
ditions conducive to flexible, participatory inter-
ventions is not encouraging. Gibbs et al. (1998:xv),
for example, find that 'even when agreements on
working relationships are reached ... many are
poorly grounded or so prescriptive as to overwhelm
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the flexibility that makes NGOs/CBOs attractive
partners in the first place'. Nelson (1995) finds that
'the World Banks organisational culture is incom-
patible with the participatory, flexible operation
that many NGOs require'. The literature on
BankNGO interactions contains numerous
accounts of NGO attempts to intervene as 'mission-
aries' - some of them successful but many of them
frustrated." Because this form of involvement
implies challenging the Banks standard modus
operandi and requires some level of shared opera-
tional control, the potential for complications and
conflict is considerable. This form of interaction
represents, therefore, greater opportunity to draw
on NGOs' comparative advantages, but also greater
challenges and risks.
4.4 NGOs as revolutionaries
As 'revolutionaries', NGOs seek involvement in
Bank-financed projects for strategic or political rea-
sons. Their objective is to influence Bank and/or
government decisions and actions - often in rela-
tion to issues such as poverty reduction, social jus-
tice, environmental protection and indigenous
peoples' rights (or human rights more broadly).
Such strategic engagement can take the form of
operational cooperation. Examples are: NGOs con-
tracted by the Bank to carry out environmental or
social assessments, to organise or facilitate public
consultations (on proposed policies or national
strategies), to implement a resettlement plan or to
monitor a project's compliance with defined envi-
ronmental or social safeguards. It can also involve
independent action on the part of NGOs, for exam-
ple, independent monitoring of Bank activities or
strategic NGO-financed research or impact assess-
ments.8 The best publicised examples are those
where NGOs intervene in outright opposition to
Banklgovernment activities, for example in order to
block or significantly modify a planned project or to
draw public attention to projects that have caused
negative impacts, demanding corrective or compen-
satory measures.'9 Such interventions often involve
coalitions of directly affected groups (or their repre-
sentatives) and national or international NGOs who
share their concerns. This mode of interaction is
closely linked to NGO advocacy activities aimed at
the Bank, with the difference that it seeks to affect
change by combining policy dialogue with actions
(collaborative or confrontational) at the field level.'0
NGO interventions as revolutionaries are no doubt
the least frequent of the four identified forms of
NGO involvement in Bank projects. Although
examples of this type of NGO intervention are rela-
tively rare, those few NGOs that have invested time
and energy in seeking to influence the Bank in this
way have met with considerable success. In partic-
ular in the case of independent protest, high levels
of commitment and capacity are required on the
part of NGOs. This must include in-depth knowl-
edge of the issues, well-developed networking and
advocacy skills, visibility and credibility (at local,
national and, sometimes, international levels) and
adequate resources (human and financial) to devote
to the cause.
4.5 Are these different forms of NGO
involvement in Bank projects 'partnership'?
This article has purposefully not used the term
'partnership' to refer to NGO involvement in Bank-
financed projects. Like other donors, the Bank has
a tendency to (mis)use the 'p' word liberally in
referring to its various interactions with NGOs.
(The Bank also refers to borrowing governments,
private sector contractors, civil society organisa-
tions, project beneficiaries, regional multilateral
development banks, UN agencies, bilateral donors,
etc., as its 'partners'.) For years now, development
practitioners and, in particular, southern NGOs
have expressed increasing frustration with official
aid agencies that preach partnership but practice
something different (Muchunguzi and Mime 1995;
Malhotra 1997; Fade 1997; Abugre 1999). Fowler
(2000) refers to the 'pathology of partnership' and
points out that the term is frequently used to mask
unhealthy and disempowering relationships.
If we accept the basic principles of partnership (as
defined in the NGO literature) as mutual goals,
long-term commitment, shared decision-making,
and reciprocal accountability, then it is probably
incorrect to refer to any of the four identified modes
of NGO involvement as 'partnership'. The fact that
BankNGO operational interaction is limited to the
confines of a predetermined and time-bound pro-
ject cycle and that, during the life of the project, it
is the borrowing government and not the Bank that
owns and manages the project and maintains work-
ing relations with NGOs, in itself largely precludes
the possibility of establishing genuine 'partnership'
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between the World Bank and an NGO. It is not
impossible that the Bank could enter into a lasting
relationship with an NGO where mutual goals are
discussed and agreed, decision-making powers are
shared and accountability is a two-way process.
But, at least at the present time, this scenario is far
from typical of NGO involvement in Bank
projects.
5 Conclusions and
Recommendations
The system of classification proposed here shows
that BankNGO operational collaboration can take
on very different forms and serve diverse purposes.
Available evidence suggests that reactive/submissive
forms of involvement (NGOs as 'beneficiaries' and
'mercenaries') are much more common than proac-
tive/critical forms ('missionaries' or 'revolutionar-
ies'). Transfer of funds (from the Bank to
CBOs/NGOs) lies at the heart of the former, while
in the latter NGOs are more likely to contribute
their own resources towards achieving development
goals. While the latter hold greater potential to
bring significant benefits, they are also most likely
to be of a criticallconflictual nature. This article also
concludes that it is probably inaccurate, at the pre-
sent time, to refer to any of the four identified forms
of interaction as 'authentic partnerships'.
This article has found that weaknesses on the part
of both NGOs and the Bank continue to limit the
potential benefits of collaboration. The following
are recommendations for both the Bank and NGOs
aimed at promoting more significant and produc-
tive collaboration in future.
5.1 Recommendations for MDBs
Be explicit in planning NGO involvement. During pro-
ject preparation stages, Bank staff in collaboration
with NGOs should define why NGO involvement in
the project is sought, identify the specific goals and
expectations of their involvement, clearly define the
specific tasks and responsibilities of participating
NGOs and outline the specific measures and proce-
dures that will be put in place to facilitate produc-
tive collaboration. This information should be
included systematically in the appraisal reports of
projects involving NGOs.
Better assessment of NGOs. A common error on the
part of Bank staff is to over-estimate NGO capacity
- defining NGO roles on the basis of wishful think-
ing rather than a realistic assessment of existing
capacity NGO involvement in Bank projects is also
frequently planned without a proper understanding
of the history and nature of the NGO/CBO commu-
nity, the environment in which they work and the
nature of their relations with government. The Bank
needs to devote more time and energy to under-
standing NGOs and their relations with
government at the country level, It should also be
more rigorous in assessing the credibility and
capacity of NGOs with whom it seeks to work and,
where appropriate, devote more attention and
resources to NGO capacity-building activities.
More rigour and precision in monitoring NGO involve-
ment. In the early days of BankNGO collaboration,
it made strategic sense for the Bank's NGO Unit to
emphasise the growing importance of the phenom-
enon and to err on the side of over- rather than
under-estimation on the basis of available informa-
tion. At the current time, however, the Bank's sys-
tem of monitoring collaboration with NGOs is
inadequate and potentially even counterproductive.
By exaggerating the true extent of NGO involve-
ment in Bank projects, it runs the risks of creating
unrealistic and unattainable expectations. The Bank
should shift its emphasis towards monitoring the
quality of NGO involvement, with a focus on the
purpose and results of that involvement. Enhancing
the quality of information contained in project
appraisal reports (as suggested above) is one impor-
tant step in this direction. Including an evaluation
of NGO activities in project supervision and com-
pletion reports would also facilitate more meaning-
ful monitoring. Finally, the Bank might consider
inviting members of the NGO Working Group on
the Bank andlor its growing network of country-
level NGO specialists to contribute to its yearly
monitoring exercise - by providing more detailed
and qualitative information on a sample of identi-
fied projects with NGO involvement.
Improved use of participatory methods. Until the Bank
is able to translate its participation rhetoric into
practice, the scope for meaningful NGO involve-
ment in Bank projects and the ability of NGOs to
deliver hoped-for benefits, remains limited. NGOs
and CBOs can potentially play an important role in
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assisting the Bank to enhance primary stakeholder
participation - but only if Bank staff understand
and are open to participatory approaches and are
willing and able to make appropriate provision for
their use. The Bank still faces many challenges (at
the attitudinal, policy and procedural levels) in this
regard.
5.2 Recommendations for NGOs
Know what you want and what you can offer. As has
been discussed, a common error on the part of
NGOs is to enter into working relations with the
Bank without clearly thinking through the purpose
of the collaboration, what they expect to achieve
and what they can offer. In order to collaborate
effectively, NGOs must first establish their own
goals and priorities and assess the benefits and risks
of the proposed collaboration. It is also ïn NGOs'
interests to be honest about their own operational
capacities and to resist the temptation to over-com-
mit or over-stretch their limits. NGOs should be
wary of taking on tasks outside of their defined
mandate or area of expertise and also be cautious
about excessive scaling-up (for example, accepting
to work with loo villages when currently working
with only 10).
Negotiate. Once NGOs have established their own
expectations, goals and capacities, they must learn
to negotiate acceptable working arrangements and
procedures. Productive working relationships do
not just happen; they are the result of a process of
communication and negotiation. NGOs should not
underestimate their bargaining power. Although
they may feel small and powerless vis-à-vis the
Bank, the reality may often be that the Bank 'needs'
NGOs more than the other way around. All parties
have an interest in agreeing to terms and conditions
that will allow NGOs to function effectively and
achieve (mutually agreed) operational goals. An
important aspect of effective negotiation is a will-
ingness to say no. When goals are not compatible,
when conditions are unworkable or an organisa-
tion credibility or constituency links are placed in
jeopardy, NGOs must be prepared to decline
involvement in a Bank project. Even if Bank over-
tures may be tempting from a resource mobilisation
point of view, there is no long-term gain for NGOs
in committing to a working arrangement that is
doomed to fail.
Know the Bank. Another element of successful nego-
tiation is being well-informed. NGOs can only
negotiate effectively with the Bank if they under-
stand the basic functioning of the institution, are
informed of current and upcoming projects (in their
particular country or sector of interest) and have a
working knowledge of its operational rules and
procedures. Fortunately, over the past decade, the
Bank has significantly enhanced its information dis-
closure policy and practices. A large range of infor-
mation (regarding the Bank's mandate and
institutional structure, operational policies and pro-
cedures, portfolio of current and upcoming projects
as weil as information, guidelines and lessons
learned on BankNGO cooperation) are available
from the Bankh website, NGO Unit, various Public
Information Centres and Resident Missions. Groups
outside the Bank such as the NGO Working Group
on the Bank and the Bank Information Centre are
also valuable sources of information and advice.
Given the central role of government counterparts
in most Bank-related activities, it is also desirable
for NGOs to establish independent contacts with
and develop a good understanding of relevant line
ministries.
Network. A final recommendation for NGOs seeking
eract with the Bank is to make linkages and join
forces with other NGOs in the same country or sec-
tor. NGOs who have never worked with the Bank
Notes
The New Policy Agenda, as described for example by
Moore (1993) and Robinson (1993), derives from a
combination of neo-liberal economics and liberal
democratic theory
2 While this article focuses on the World Bank, the
issues discussed may be relevant to NGO relations
with multilateral development banks more generally
- in particular the African and Asian Development
Banks that have adopted NGO-related policies and
guidelines similar to those of the World Bank.
3 Por example, the programmes of international NGOs
are estimated to have doubled in real size between
1975 and 1985, by 1993 representing 14 per cent of
all development assistance or US$8.5 billion per
annum. In many developing countries, numbers of
officially registered NGOs grew exponentially in the
same period. For example, there are currently an
estimated 18,000 registered NGOs in the
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have a particular interest in learning from the expe-
rience of others that have. Where lobbying or
protest is involved, evidence clearly shows that net-
working between NGOs at the local, national and
international levels is much more likely to bring
results than any of the groups intervening on their
own. Where a number of operational NGOs are
involved in the same project, the chances of suc-
cessfully negotiating flexibility in project design and
appropriately adapted procedures are greater if
NGOs can establish operating principles among
themselves and negotiate collectively with the Bank.
NGOs' record of successful networking and inter-
organisational collaboration is not particularly
encouraging. Edwards and Hulme (1996:6), for
example, find that examples of alliances of NGOs at
different levels are rare and point out that direct
funding from official donors can serve to erode col-
laborative relations between NGOs by placing them
in open competition with one another for scarce
resources. In this regard, however, the large scale of
World Bank operations could represent a potential
advantage. Gibbs et al. (1998:x) report that the
demand for partnerships with NGOs/CBOs exceeds
the supply of willing and able partners'. In the con-
text of any given project/programme, there is likely
to be ample opportunity and resources for all NGOs
with requisite skills to participate, thus lessening
the tensions related to competition for scarce
resources.
Philippines, 5,000 in Tunisia and 3,000 in Brazil.
4 See, for example, Edwards and Hulme (1992).
5 Nelson defines as a major role', when NGO5 con-
tribute to protect design, receive direct funding or
enter into conflict with the Bank.
6 It should be noted that findings of both Nelson and
Gibbs et al. are based largely on projects approved in
the 1980s. Gibbs et al. find encouraging evidence
that more recent projects tend to have more signifi-
cant and successful NGO involvement.
7 It is not indicated what type of 'expertise' is sought.
8 See, for example, Bhatnagar (1991), Hino (1996),
Malena (1997), Voorhies (1993) and World Vision
(1996).
9 Three factors are identified as essential in determining
successful outcomes: a supportive environment for
NGO/CBO activities, effective working relationships
and adequate and balanced capacities of all partners
(NGOs, government and Bank).
10 Nelson (1995) found that projects with major' NGO
involvement tended to involve joint participation by
a variety of different (grassroots, national and inter-
national level) NGOs.
11 In the case of institutional development or capacity-
building activities, the beneficiary could also be a
non-membership, 'intermediary' NGO.
12 And, it must be said, not necessarily an effective way
of targeting the poorest members of society who are
often excluded from or marginalised within such
groups.
13 Progress reports indicate an increasing tendency on
the part of the Bank to work directly with CBOs.
While this focus on grassroots organisations is wel-
come, it should not be at the exclusion of intermedi-
ary NGOs that have a key role to play in facilitating
effective participation.
14 1-lulme and Edwards (1997:277) report that 'Large
numbers of new organisations are being formed on
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